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This qualitative inductive research explores the potential benefits for the Scandinavian 
economy and ports through the implementation of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as an 
alternative for container shipping to the established Southern route through the Suez 
Canal. To extract expert’s opinions and address these objectives, we utilised in-depth 
face-to-face semi-structured interviews through purposive sampling in a single case 
study setting. 
The analysis of the data demonstrates that the commercialisation of NSR can yield 
benefits for the Scandinavian economy (e.g. GDP increase, jobs creation) and reveals the 
benefits of Scandinavian ports (e.g. ECA’s, flexibility, hinterland, etc.) compared to other 
ports in North West Europe, which potentially grasp the NSR as an opportunity. 
However, it is highlighted that this can only be achieved if Scandinavian countries are 
proactive and secure their involvement. 
 
Key words 





The current poor economic and trade environment caused by the financial crisis of 2008, and 
the oversupply of vessels creates mismatches in supply and demand in the shipping industry 
(UNCTAD 2016). Subsequently, to remain competitive and offer cost efficient shipping 
solutions, ship owners dropped freight rates considerably (Drewry 2016). The use of the 
Northern Sea Route (NSR) appears as an alternative to achieve further cost reductions due to 
shorter sailing distance compared to the southern route (Lasserre 2014). In particular, the use 
of NSR could benefit container transport due to reduced sailing distance and avoiding risks 
associated to southern route (Furuichi and Otsuka 2015). The utilisation of those benefits could 
lead to further reduction of transportation costs for container shipping which struggles to 
survive under the current tight operational environment, e.g. bankruptcy of Hanjin Shipping 
the former 7th largest container company in the world (Wright 2016). This paper aims to explore 
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how Scandinavian economies and ports could flourish through the use of the NSR, as a viable 
alternative for container shipping.  
The NSR, the passage along the Siberian coast, stretching from the Kola Peninsula in 
the West to the Bering Strait in the East, is part of the shortest connection between Northern 
Europe and Northeast Asia (i.e. Japan, South Korea, North-East China etc.) (Schøyen and 
Bråthen 2011). In these cases its navigational distance can be up to 40% shorter than the 
southern route via the Suez Canal (onwards stated as the Southern route, see Figure 1) (Liu and 
Kronbak 2010). The route was historically claimed and utilised by Russia as a national 
transport artery. However, in 1991, NSR opened to the international community, and currently 
recasts as an alternative trade route to the Southern route (Brubaker and Ragner 2010). 
 
 
Figure 1: The Northern Sea Route versus the Southern Route, (Source: Vidal 2013) 
 
According to NSIDC (2017), the annual average sea-ice extent of the Russian artic has 
been reduced on an accelerating rate over the past 40 years. Thus, it made NSR attractive to 
commercial shipping by being ice-free on an average of 6 months and not requiring escort of 
icebreakers for some days (McGrath 2017; Khon et al. 2017). That led to increased traffic, 
however, only destinational traffic seems to be benefited while through-traffic has been 
reduced (Humpert 2017). In the period 2011-2016, a total of 217 vessels of multiple 
nationalities passed through NSR for commercial and scientific purposes (NSR Information 
Office 2017). Establishing NSR as an alternative transit trade route could provide more agile, 
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adaptable and flexible supply chains, as further route choices can result in greater capacity, and 
may decrease the likelihood of congestion and disruption (Schøyen and Bråthen 2011).  
The NSR is prolonged to comprise the entire Norwegian shoreline (See Figure 2), 
including innumerable Norwegian ports. However, limited research has been devoted to 
examine Norway’s potential interest in the route and how that could affect the Scandinavian 
region. Gunnarsson (2014) calls for exploration of physical infrastructure in connection with a 
potential commercialisation of the NSR, including sufficient port facilities. Although Norway 
is small in comparison to Arctic “heavyweights” such as USA, Canada and Russia (Hastings 
2014), its strategic geographical location for the European market has the potentials to make 
Norway an important player within the Scandinavian region.  
The 10% annual growth in container shipping in 2014 in Norway (Haram 2015), was 
succeed by further increase in 2015 (Statistics Norway 2017). This implies that Norwegian 
container traffic currently experiences an increase, which may suggest that ports are already 
considering expansion opportunities to comply with this development. However, should the 
NSR become commercialised there would be a distinct need for ports to engage in rapid 
development to secure Norway’s, and as an extent Scandinavia’s position as an Arctic actor. 
This opportunity further amplifies the need for exploratory research on the potential impact of 
NSR on Scandinavia’s economy and ports. 
 
 
Figure 2: Norwegian Container Ports in Relation to the NSR, (Source: Created with Google 
Maps) 
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The remainder of this paper is divided as follows. Section 2 reviews the extant literature 
on the NSR, and highlights how Scandinavia could be benefited from NSR. Section 3 describes 
the methodological approach of the paper, and justifies the use of a case study. Thereafter, 
Section 4 presents the empirical findings of this research and critically compares them with the 
findings of the literature before presenting the conclusions in Section 5.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Maritime transportation forms the backbone of international trade (Talley and Ng 2013). In 
2015, global seaborne container trade experienced an annual growth rate of 0.9% (down from 
6.6% in 2014), reaching a total of 175 million TEUs (UNCTAD 2016, 2015). This marginal 
growth was the outcome of the sanctions imposed to Russia (Knowler 2016), weak Euro and 
inventories adjustments (UNCTAD, 2016). However, the Asia-Europe container volumes are 
estimated to grow by 40% from 2006 to 2030, and by 100% from 2006 to 2050, indicating that 
the positive trend will continue in the impending decades (DNV, 2010). This development is 
further reflected in the average ship size on this route, as it expanded from approximately 8,000 
TEUs in 2009 to 10,300 in 2013 (Drewry 2015).  
The continuous expansion of vessel sizes has also resulted in overcapacity; the 
cascading effect where ship capacity is moved from main trade routes to secondary routes or 
premature scrapping (e.g. seven-year old-Panamax container ship) (UNCTAD, 2016). The 
vessel type that suffers mostly is the old-Panamax, because ship owners attempt to reduce their 
operational cost by deploying larger vessels due to revoked restrictions of canals (e.g. the 
Panama Canal). However, by deploying old-Panamax2 on the NSR (), ship owners would be 
able to compete the low operational costs achieved by larger container ships due to economies 
of scale (UNCTAD 2016) and avoid premature scrapping. Indubitably, as Merk (2016) argues, 
recently the economies of scale anticipated by the deployment of large container vessels, have 
been questioned  due to vessels’ low utilisation. Further, Merk (2016) asserts that ports and 
terminals question the aforementioned benefits. Consequently, the deployment of fully utilised 
smaller vessels on shorter distances (e.g. NSR) could reduce the overall maritime transport 
operational costs. That shorter distance will be the case, as Asian mother ships are gradually 
abandoning Southeast Asia for Northern China (Verny and Grigentin, 2009). 
Suez Canal is the predominant trade route between Asia and Europe, with particular 
benefits for container traffic (Verny and Grigentin 2009). Distinctively, 34% of the vessels 
                                                          
2 according to Meng et al. (2017) old-Panamax is mostly adopted from the literature due to draft restrictions. 
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navigating the canal in 2015 were container vessels (Suez Canal Traffic Statistics 2015). 
However, if the Suez Canal is to avoid congestion and disruption it must adapt to the continuous 
traffic growth (Drewry 2008). Therefore, the anticipated increase of container movements in 
combination with the finite capacity of the southern route creates an opportunity and motivation 
to explore other alternative trade routes. 
2.1 A New Alternative Trade Route 
The NSR lies in Arctic waters and within Russia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). 
Historically the route was governed by the Russian Administration of the NSR (ANSR) 
(Ragner 2000b). However, in March 2013 the NSR Administration (NSRA) replaced the old 
structure, thereby enabling a simpler administrative handling of vessels using the route (e.g. a 
four months’ notice was replaced by an electronic 15-day minimum application notice system) 
(Moe 2014). Such administrative efficiencies improve the attractiveness and competitiveness 
of the NSR but still on a lagging level compared to the Suez Canal, which operates on a four 
days’ notice basis (Suez Canal Authority 2015). Finally, the NSR fees became more transparent 
as the NSRA published tariffs for ships rendered by the ice-breaker FSUE “ATOMFLOT” 
(Novikov 2014). 
2.2 Scandinavia in the Northern Sea Route 
The Scandinavian country that has the largest exposure to the NSR is Norway, as Sweden and 
Finland are geographically isolated, and Denmark is far too close to the main European 
markets/ports. Thus, our focus is Norway, as its exposure to the NSR could positively affect 
the entire Scandinavian region.  Historically, Norway has heavily utilised the natural resources 
of its surrounding oceans, which created a tradition of a world leading maritime nation 
(Brautaset and Tenold 2008). Norway’s extensive coastlines, in combination with the country’s 
substantial involvement in maritime activities (e.g. fisheries, oil and gas activities, etc. (Reve, 
2012)), necessitated the development of numerous ports (See Figure 2). Although Norway is 
located on the same latitude as Northern Canada, Greenland and Northern Siberia, its climate 
is significantly warmer due to the North Atlantic Current (Amundsen and Lie 2011). 
Consequently, Norwegian ports are ice-free all year around, thus ideal conditions for shipping 
activities are offered.  
However, in past decades shipping has not been the driving force of the country’s 
economy. The oil and gas sector constitutes 22% of the Norwegian GDP and 67% of the 
country’s exports (European Commission 2015). Nevertheless, since early 2014 Norway has 
experienced an ‘oil-crisis’ provoked by the dwindling oil price, which resulted in significant 
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jobs losses (Henley 2017). The above suggests that Norway needs new jobs opportunities 
related to the experience of the existing workforce. Shipping is a sector that can employ the 
redundant workforce, and generate opportunities to strengthen Norway’s economy in the light 
of the declining of its main export. Through the use of North Norwegian ports, positive 
synergies could be created for both Sweden and Finland (thus Scandinavia as a whole). Such 
synergies could facilitate the transport of goods on Swedish and Finnish rail network, as there 
is not a good rail alternative from the North to the South within the Norwegian boarders 
(Staalesen, 2017a). Through that rail network, also European products could be transferred 
(ibid). Finland have examined the opportunity of an “Arctic railway” to connect the North with 
markets in Central Europe. A Scandinavian collaboration could strengthen the possibility to 
make this happen as a shared effort between the Scandinavian countries (Staalesen, 2017b).  
As the NSR embraces the entire Norwegian coast, that automatically provides Norway 
with a geographical advantage compared to other Arctic nations. The strategic position in 
combination with the country’s arctic and maritime experience could potentially provide large 
opportunities for economy and ports. 
Another factor suggesting the timeliness of Norway’s appeal to the NSR is the 
establishment of Emission Control Areas (ECAs), with the purpose to regulate and minimise 
airborne emissions. According to IMO (2014), effective 2015, ships are required to use lower 
sulphur fuel within ECAs, as the maximum limit decreased from 1.00% to 0.10%. 
Consequently, sailing within ECAs increases operational costs (high low-sulphur fuels price), 
and operational complexities (procedure of switching fuels) (Hapag-Lloyd 2016). As the entire 
northern coast of Norway is positioned outside ECAs, Norwegian ports become attractive for 
the establishment of a transhipment hub, accommodating multimodal transport, along the route. 
Consequently, shipping lines could reduce operational costs on the Asia-Europe axis, through 
the use of cheaper sulphur fuels, and risks related to engine failure when vessels switch from 
normal to low-sulphur (Wain et al. 2005). Smaller feeder vessels, using low sulphur fuel, could 
then transport the cargo to neighbouring ports in Central Europe (Rotterdam, Hamburg, etc.) 
inside the ECAs. That is a unique characteristic that Norway has in comparison with the other 
Scandinavian countries, as ECAs include only the Baltic and the North Sea (IMO, 2017). Thus, 
we focus on the Norwegian ports, as they are more attractive than the other Scandinavian ports 
for the NSR traffic.    
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2.3 Benefits from NSR on Container Shipping 
Extant literature reports several costs and risks to consider when investigating the viability of 
the NSR as alternative route for container shipping. Firstly, ice-classed vessels are more 
expensive compared to ordinary vessels, with a capital cost premium of +20-40% (Lasserre 
2014). Secondly, according to Sarrabezoles, Lasserre, and Hagouagn'rin (2016), the increased 
uncertainty and risk encountered, result in considerably higher insurance costs due to the 
limited international experience in underwriting insurance for ice-classed ships undertaking 
trans-Arctic voyages. Harsher navigational conditions suggest more damage to vessels, thus 
higher Repairs and Maintenance (R&M) costs (Schøyen and Bråthen 2011, Somanathan, 
Flynn, and Szymanski 2009). Further, the ice-breaking fee is one of the main voyage costs 
(Novikov 2014), in addition to fuel costs (Rahman, Saharuddin, and Rasdi 2014). Finally, liner 
companies have to account for the potential costs of delay due to uncertain ice-conditions 
(Verny and Grigentin 2009), and capacity utilisation costs, as the largest container ships cannot 
transit the NSR (Liu and Kronbak 2010). Notwithstanding, the NSR appears as more profitable 
than the Southern route, because the shorter sailing distance enables more rotations, thus 
transporting more TEUs (Lasserre 2014). Several studies indicate that sailing through NSR 
requires less fuel (Liu and Kronbak, 2010; Ragner, 2000 b; Wergeland, 2017), and is therefore 
more attractive should fuel prices rise as predicted by the International Energy Agency (Rapier 
2016). Due to the novelty of the subject, we acknowledge that savings mentioned above are 
not conclusive (e.g. Lasserre et al., 2016; Pruyn, 2016; Meng et al., 2017).  
Compared to the Southern route, container shipping on the NSR will generate new risks. 
Environmental aspects arise with increased maritime traffic shifted to a highly sensitive area, 
while Arctic operation imply increased risks as vessels face tougher navigational circumstances 
(Wergeland 1992). Thus, ships risk delays, which could lead to credibility damage and 
financial penalties (Lasserre 2014). Infrastructure on Russian territory appears underdeveloped 
and of poor standard (Xu et al. 2011, Lasserre 2014) – which in turn limits the ship service and 
repair possibilities (Ho 2010, Kitagawa 2008). Additionally, Ragner (2000a) argues that the 
network of ports fulfils only basic needs, with capacity and equipment deteriorating, which 
may delay stevedoring. Regardless, there could be opportunities for Norwegian ports to 
compete with, or replace the ports used by shipping lines along the route, as Norwegian ports 
are highly developed and maintained due to oil and gas operations (Tormodsgard 2014). 
Ragner (2000a) further argues that safe navigation is dependent on ice-breakers, thus Russia 
actively builds new ice breakers with state-of-the-art features (Revesz 2017) resulting  in a total 
of 40 ice-breakers with 11 on order (Osborn 2017). However, improved navigational 
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circumstances along the NSR might make the use of these vessels unnecessary, as mentioned 
in section 1. Safety in terms of search and rescue is also an issue tackled by the recently issued 
Polar Code. However, Polar Code has been criticised both for narrow scope on safety and 
environmental aspects (Chircop 2016), thus does not burden the NSR users.    
Finally, the Russian governance and policy to foreign vessel transits appear as decisive 
uncertainties, making shipping lines cautious towards investments in the region (Schøyen and 
Bråthen 2011). This risk could potentially be mitigated by establishing operations in Norway, 
which practices a more transparent regulatory framework3.  According to the U.S. Department 
of State (2014, 1) Norway “welcomes  foreign investments as a matter of policy and generally 
grants national treatment to foreign investors”. Consequently, establishing international 
transhipment operations in the country is easier. Compared to the Southern route, the Arctic is 
associated with greater risk levels (Appendix 1). However, shipping lines must consider these 
in relation to potential benefits, such as shorter sailing distance, reduced fuels costs, and 
increased productivity. DNV (2010) states that climate impacts from shipping is not restricted 
to the Arctic, and efforts to address global emissions will also benefit the Arctic. As air 
emissions from ships primarily correlate to travel distances, shorter shipping routes such as the 
NSR, may result in less environmental impact (Schøyen and Bråthen 2011). In addition, the 
use of NSR will reduce further the fuel consumption of containerships, which are the vessels 
with the worst CO2 profile (only the 4,400 TEU category produces as CO2 emissions as the 
entire crude oil tanker fleet) (Psaraftis and Kontovas, 2009). Thus, NSR will contribute to 
drastically reduce the CO2 emissions of shipping.  Considering the aforementioned aspects, the 
NSR appears as a viable option for container shipping compared to the Southern route thus 
Norwegian (and in extent Scandinavian) economy could grasp that benefit and succeed both in 
terms of increased GDP and reemploying the currently unutilized workforce laid off from the 
oil and gas sector. 
 
 
                                                          
3 Norway ranks 6/190 countries, while Russian Federation’s rank 40th in the World Bank Doing Business Report 
(2017), and 6/176, in the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (2016) while Russian 
federation 131st.   
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Case study 
Barratt et al. (2011, 329) define a qualitative case study as ‘an empirical research 
that primarily uses contextually rich data from bounded real-world settings to investigate a 
focused phenomenon’. One of the strategy’s attributes is that it examines in depth at one, or a 
limited number of subjects; for example, one country, which is the perspective in this research. 
The case study strategy relies on several sources of evidence, which often include interviews, 
observation and documentary analysis converging in data triangulation (Yin 2009). Although 
multiple sources of data are one of the main strengths of the case study strategy, there are also 
several weaknesses.  
There is restricted published literature examining the impact of NSR for Norway, and 
the Scandinavian region, indicating that a contribution from experts within Arctic development 
is necessary to collect reliable data. On this basis, 25 face-to-face interviews4 were conducted 
with highly ranked experts from ports, freight forwarders, shipping lines, government 
representatives as well as academics and consultants during the summer of 2015. The experts 
were all Norwegians, except one British artic insurance expert, and one Danish academic in 
the field.  The participants were considered appropriate because of their experience from 
current and past positions. Figure 3 presents the distribution of the participants based on their 
respective field of expertise. A common feature for container shipping research is the heavy 
presence of port- and shipping line participants, as they are the key actors in this sector (Slack 
1985, Yap and Lam 2006).  
 
                                                          
4 Full version of questionnaires could be provided upon request.  
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Figure 3: Distribution of Interviewed Experts, (Source: Author’s own) 
 
Ellram (1996) states that due to limited sample size, qualitative research findings cannot 
be generalised. However, Mitchell (1983) argues that the ability to generate theory from the 
research is more important than generalisability concerns. 
Data collection ceases when saturation is achieved (Glaser and Strauss 1967); saturation 
is the point where no new insights are gained (Krueger and Casey 2014). On this basis, the 
researchers stopped collecting data after reaching 25 interviews.  
3.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
This paper utilises multiple techniques to gather qualitative data to achieve data triangulation 
and allow researchers to attain a fuller picture of the enquired phenomenon (Myers 2013). The 
literature review informed the interview questions, while a pilot interview, as suggested by 
Turner (2010), was conducted to determine potential weaknesses within the interview design.  
For the collected data to be useful, it needs to be understood and analysed. Considering 
the relatively small sample size, and the inductive approach, a template analysis is conducted. 
Template analysis is a style of thematic analysis that balances the flexibility to adapt to the 
requirements of a specific study with a high degree of structure in the analysis (King 2012). A 
template is a list of “a-priori” and emergent codes, revised until all emergent threads of 
narrative are coded. The “a-priori codes” derive from the literature, whilst the emergent codes 
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4. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Scandinavia’s Arctic Engagement 
To set the context and elucidate Scandinavia’s Arctic engagement, interviewees were asked to 
comment on Scandinavia’s current position as an Arctic actor. In majority, they identified that 
Norway is a strong Arctic nation, with considerable experience in Arctic operations. Moreover, 
some experts highlighted that 80% of Arctic shipping takes place in Norwegian waters, thus 
describing Norway as a centre for Arctic economic activity. However, others believed 
Norway’s current position is unsatisfactory, especially regarding a potential commercialisation 
of the Arctic.  
Eighty-eight percent of the interviewees emphasised Norway’s political involvement, 
describing it as a key element in the country’s Arctic engagement. Amongst them consensus 
that Norway has visible and active politics, with ambitions to be a leading nation in both 
utilising and preserving the Arctic was achieved, as illustrated below: 
 “Norway has promoted these areas as its main strategic priority, including a heavy 
commitment from the Norwegian authorities regarding awareness about the Arctic and 
the Northern areas, and the responsibility that is imposed” (Consultant 1).  
Norway’s position in the Arctic Council was highlighted as highly influential, alongside 
the country’s efforts in Arctic preparedness and Search and Rescue (SAR) operations. Finally, 
Norway’s extensive relationship with Russia was of great importance, both politically and 
through cooperation.   
 Sixty-nine percent of interviewees responded that the NSR is of considerable 
importance for Norway, while the remaining 31% stated that the NSR is irrelevant. The 
divergent opinions are evident through the following statements:  
“The NSR has a potential of becoming very important. One can compare it to what the 
Suez Canal has meant for Egypt” (Consultant 2) and “We have the Barents Sea and the 
fishing activities there, that is what is important for us today. In the future, it will be the 
oil and gas. We are not dependent on the NSR” (Consultant 3).  
The empirical findings indicate that Norway, in comparison to other Scandinavian 
countries, has a relevant and solid position as an Arctic actor, both politically and through 
research related to maritime operations. This is further confirmed by the country’s position in 
the Arctic Council, where all the Arctic states have shown a dedicated interest in developing 
and implementing Arctic strategies (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). Thus, 
ensuring cooperation and dialogue across national borders. Furthermore, the geographical areas 
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that Norway possess north of the Arctic Circle underpin the significance of Norway’s position 
– as illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4: Norway's Geographical Areas, (Source: Author’s own adapted from Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014) 
 
Nevertheless, 68% of the interviewees argued that the significance of the route lies in 
the long term. They also emphasised that should the route be commercialised; Norway would 
have to be proactive to secure its involvement, otherwise it would be a lost opportunity. 
Participation and investment by commercial stakeholders, as well as the Norwegian 
government, were further highlighted as important measures to secure the potential benefits.  
While looking further into why NSR is important, several opportunities were 
mentioned, such as service, maintenance, supply and reloading. Furthermore, discussions 
regarding what Norway will do when the oil perishes were highlighted. The oil market in 
Scandinavia and specifically in Norway currently struggles, and thousands of jobs are lost 
(Business Insider Nordic 2016; News in English 2015). Consequently, some interviewees 
argued that the NSR could represent a great prospect for offshore companies to create new 
opportunities and solutions, thereby utilising the innovative business environment in the North. 
Although the majority considered NSR to be of importance, 32% of the interviewees 
underlined regional traffic in the North to be the most promising on a short-term basis.  
Scandinavian Economy and NSR 
For Scandinavia to engage in a potential commercialisation of NSR, it is essential to understand 
why the NSR could be important. Increased traffic on the NSR implies increased activity along 
the Norwegian coastline, thus creating substantial business opportunities, particularly for ports.  
In correspondence with the consensus concerning Norway’s arctic engagement, 
interviewees consent on the potential economic benefits of NSR for the Norwegian economy 
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and the overall Scandinavian economy, if several conditions are met. Figure 5 summarises the 
relevant responses.  
 
 
Figure 5: Conditions that must be in place for the Scandinavian economy to benefit from the 
NSR, (Source: Author’s own) 
 
Nevertheless, some interviewees stated the opinion that these benefits are relative to the 
development costs, as the macroeconomic equation might show that Norway is left with less 
surplus than initially expected. However, others assert that the marginal cost of developing 
suitable container terminals in the North would be limited to building the terminals. That is 
because Norway has large part of its population living north of the Arctic Circle, with a 
considerably more modern economy and settlements than other Scandinavian countries. Thus, 
infrastructure (e.g. power plants, hospitals, airports and diversified business clusters) to support 
such a venture already exists.   
However, as the findings specified, Norway must be prepared and equipped for such an 
increase to secure its involvement. This will require private and public sector investments. 
However, the unspecified scale of these investments could delay Norway’s deployment in 
NSR. The implications of such delay is that ships will not have any incentive to call Norwegian 
ports. As such, Norway might lose the competitive advantage provided by its strategic 
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geographical location. Both empirical and literature review findings support that, Norway is 
not reliant on the NSR due to already established and profitable industries (e.g. fishing, oil and 
gas sector). Thus, governmental and private actors may hesitate to invest in new and uncertain 
business areas, such as the NSR.  
Employment  
The economic importance of NSR for Norway was further highlighted by the comments of 
interviewees about the positive relationship between the commercialisation of NSR and the 
potentials for more jobs, and thereby more wealth in the Norwegian society, as stated below:  
“There is a potential in the NSR, and Norway will benefit from a commercialisation of 
the route. It will increase the activity in the ports, which will also increase the number of 
jobs. This is absolutely impossible to quantify, but there is a positive relationship which 
we can be quite confident about” (Academic in the field, Denmark).  
Conversely, others argued that the opportunities the NSR may provide in terms of 
service, maintenance and supply are too large to ignore. Despite Norway’s modest population 
of five million, the country possess the world’s 4th largest fleet (European Commission 2017). 
This further underpins the country’s involvement in maritime operations, including an 
environment that is ready to exploit the benefits of increased activity. Furthermore, the country 
is currently undergoing an ‘oil-crisis’ where more than 30,000 jobs are already lost (Business 
Insider Nordic 2016; News in English 2015).  
 To further understand the importance of NSR, we inquired the potential economic and 
job generating implications of the route. Although there was no consensus regarding whether 
the NSR is of importance, a clear majority of interviewees (88%) responded that they believe 
the route, if commercialised, would benefit the economy and create more jobs if utilised 
correctly. Norway has 10% of its population living North of the Arctic Circle – more than any 
other country in the world (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). Thus, the potential 
implications of increased traffic along the Norwegian coastline could contribute to generating 
a higher economic activity in these areas. This is confirmed by Næs (2015) stating that the NSR 
has the potential of creating thousands of new jobs in Northern Norway. 
4.2 Norwegian Ports in Relation to the NSR 
Increased Vessel Size 
The general perception of the interviewees was that container vessels are continuously 
enlarged, mainly due to competition between shipping lines. Some interviewees argued that 
the increase is necessary to reduce shipping costs, notwithstanding others emphasised on the 
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infrastructural and operational challenges the increasing vessel size imposes to ports. However, 
as the largest vessels currently trade between Asia and Europe, Norwegian ports are exposed 
to feeder vessels, which according to a shipping line representative are also enlarged, from an 
average of 400-450 TEUs in 1996 to 1,000-1,100 TEUs in 2015. However, 60% of the 
interviewees argued that the general increase would not have a major impact on Norwegian 
ports, as the NSR cannot accommodate ships larger than 4,000 TEUs because of natural depth 
restrictions.  
ECAs 
The interviewees were further asked to comment on the effect of ECAs to the routing and port 
selection of shipping lines. Eighty percent of the participants asserted that ECAs will have an 
impact, but a smaller percentage elaborated that this might only be a ‘temporary problem’ as 
eventually shipping lines would have to adapt. Others argued that this could be critical for some 
shipping companies, especially those engaged in short-sea shipping where it is easier to shift 
the goods to onshore alternatives. Nevertheless, the remaining four responded that ECAs do 
not have any implications for container shipping, as they are heavily dependent on several of 
the major ports inside the area, such as Rotterdam. This might be due to fuel costs at present 
being very low, and could change if the costs rise. 
Flexibility 
In majority, Norwegian ports were perceived as flexible and able to provide satisfactory service 
level. The size of the ports was highlighted, as smaller ports can easily adjust to shipping lines 
requirements. A shipping line representative stated that several of the major ports in Europe 
have difficulties in adapting to specific needs. Since these are established ports in areas with 
intense competition, they might benefit more from minimising their costs. Thus, creating a 
conflict between total flexibility and cost minimisation. However, the remaining interviewees 
(12%) argued that Norwegian ports suffer from a rigid system imposed by public or semi-
public governance. Thus, some ports struggle to keep up with the needs of the industry and the 
commercial activity. For example, Consultant 1 stated that if a community has a profit 
generating port, then it is tempting to invest the surplus in nursing homes rather than new port 
infrastructure. 
Environmental Aspects 
To elucidate the environmental aspects of Norwegian ports, port representatives were asked if 
they have environmental policies. The concurring points are illustrated in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Concurring Points Regarding Environmental Aspects of Norwegian Ports, (Source: 
Author’s own) 
Concurring points Explanation 
Environmental 
certification 




All ports have environmental monitoring systems in place, which are controlled on an 
annual base for their effectiveness and quality. 
Environmental 
Discount 
Most ports have, or are about to introduce environmental discounts on port charges (cost 
of calling the port) for gas powered ships.  
Environmental 
politics 
Several ports invested in onshore power supply (ONS) in cooperation with 
governmental actors, which is one of the strategies recommended by the World Port 
Climate Initiative (WPCI) (2015) for reducing the environmental impact of seagoing 
vessels in ports. (DNV, 2015). 
 
The interviewees were asked to comment on the potential of the above mentioned 
aspects to attract more customers to the ports. Some responded that this is very difficult to 
measure, but emphasised that a strong environmental focus is advantageous. Others argued that 
shipping lines are more concerned with costs rather than environmental aspects referring to 
examples were shipping lines chose cost efficient ports over environmental friendly ports.   
Hinterland 
Norway at present is not able to facilitate trade generated by NSR, if the goods are to be 
distributed through the country. That is because of the lack of appropriate rail and road 
infrastructure networks. However, a majority further highlighted the opportunity of 
establishing a transhipment hub, which eliminates the need of a strong and wide-ranging 
hinterland. This requires the construction of special terminals in the North, currently non-
existent because:  
“There has not been a need. First, you need a market to build the infrastructure, and there 
is no infrastructure without a market, so somebody must start. However, there are quite 
definite plans to develop the ports up there, but there have been no decisions yet” 
(Consultant 1). 
Connection to other European Ports 
Sixty percent responded that they perceive Norwegian ports to have good connections to other 
European ports in terms of both frequency and tonnage. The remaining 40% highlighted that 
Norway lies outside the central distribution network for international container transportation, 
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and that Norwegian ports, both together and separately, represent a relatively small percentage 
of the European freight volume. However, it was noted that if Norway established a 
transhipment hub, they would automatically gain a good connection to other European ports.  
Benefits Compared to other European Ports 
Thirty-six percent responded that there are no benefits as of today, while the remaining 64% 
argued that there are several benefits. The main points of concurrence are gathered in Table 2, 
while Figure 6 presents the recurrence of those points. 
 
Table 2: Potential Benefits of Norwegian Ports Compared to Ports in Northwest Europe, 
(Source: Author’s own) 
Benefits Explanation 
Free capacity All port representatives stated that their ports have free capacity to handle a rapid 




In terms of serving the NSR with a transhipment hub, the geographical location was 
highlighted. Especially since Norway is a part of Schengen and the European Economic 
Area (EEA), and thereby enables a good communication with the European Union 
(EU). 
Large areas for 
future expansion 
Norway, possess an extensive coastline, and a considerable amount of undeveloped 




Due to the size and nature of Norwegian ports, several interviewees described them as 
more flexible than European ports. 
 
Transhipment 
To operate along NSR vessels must be ice-classed, which forms a considerable expense. 
Furthermore, most vessels are depending on ice-breakers to transit the route. 
Establishing a transhipment hub in the North of Norway, e.g. Kirkenes, could limit the 
distance where an ice-classed vessel is needed. Kirkenes represents the closest point to 
where an ice-classed vessel is no longer needed, and the goods can be transhipped to 
ordinary vessels. Thus, decreasing the cost of operating such vessels. 
Environmental 
Aspects 
Norwegian ports are described to be at the forefront of onshore power supply (ONS), 
as well as other environmental aspects as discussed in section 4.2. 
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Figure 6: Distribution of Potential Benefits of Norwegian Ports Compared to Ports in 
Northwest Europe, (Source: Author’s Own) 
 
 The main emphasis was on the opportunity of establishing a transhipment hub, while 
the other benefits were evenly distributed. Although the focus was to explore the potential 
benefits compared to other established hubs in Europe, 56% of the interviewees argued that it 
is more a question of competing with Russian ports, as stated below:   
“Norway is probably better equipped to make it in the North; we have the container port 
in Kirkenes, with the same ambitions in Tromsø. There is no doubt that with relatively 
simple measures Norwegian ports could offer a better international shipping service than 
the Russian ports” (Consultant 1). 
Norwegian ports could provide a stable political environment high level of technology, 
an unmistakably better infrastructure, good communication systems, and SAR operations 
compared to Russian ports. It was highlighted that Norway has an open society with a 
regulatory framework, which in comparison to many other nations is very predictable and 
reliable. Consequently, shipping lines can expect fixed prices and no bribing. Finally, ice-free 
ports throughout the year and Norway’s experience in Arctic operation further suggest good 
conditions for container shipping.  
Tanshipment
34%
Large areas for 
future expansion
14%
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There was a consensus amongst the interviewees that Norwegian ports can satisfy the 
customised needs of shipping lines. The ports were considered as more agile than other 
European ports, where cost minimisation was described to be of greater concern. However, a 
problem that surfaced was the public ownership of the ports. If Norwegian ports should be able 
to provide benefits compared to other European ports, as well as establishing the needed 
infrastructure to serve the NSR, this might require government involvement. As indicated by 
Brooks and Cullinane (2006) port improvement and restructuring activities initiated by 
governments on the part of taxpayers and citizens can cause noteworthy unhappiness, although 
evidence suggests that such port networks prove more efficient and commercially reactive. 
Based on the findings, Norwegian ports were described to have a strong environmental focus. 
Whether this would contribute to providing a competitive advantage was difficult to verify, 
especially since shipping lines appear to be more concerned with costs rather than 
environmental engagements.  
Considering the hinterland off Norwegian ports, the most promising opportunity is the 
establishment of a transhipment hub, since this can be done regardless of the identified 
weaknesses within the hinterland. However, this requires construction of specially designed 
terminals, which would require public and private investments, as well as a clear understanding 
of the benefits Norway could reap by exploiting the first-mover advantage.  
A final point of discussion was whether Norwegian ports could offer benefits compared 
to other European ports, where the most frequently mentioned benefit was the possibility of 
transhipment as the NSR is lacking suitable ports along the route. A transhipment hub on both 
sides of the NSR, for example Norway and Alaska, could make vessels independent of the poor 
infrastructure along the Russian coast. Furthermore, it could limit the use of ice-classed vessels 
to the required areas. The findings indicated that a transhipment hub on the Norwegian side, 
rather than the Russian, could yield several benefits to shipping lines. The benefits are amongst 
others; stable regulatory framework, transparent overview of charges and fees, less risk of 
corruption, ice-free harbours and modern port facilities. The container port in Kirkenes 
represents the closest point to where an expensive ice-classed vessel is no longer needed and 
according to the interviewees is highlighted as the most suitable point to establish a 
transhipment hub. Although the NSR is currently only open six months a year (Khon et al., 
2017; Meng et al., 2017), Figure 7 illustrates the additional trade volumes that could generate 
activity for the port. Hence, creating a year-round operation and further justifying its position. 
However, the required port infrastructure is not yet in place – but can be developed fast. Cases 
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of other countries establishing transhipment hubs exist. For example, Dubai managed to take 
full advantage of its strategic location concerning the growing container traffic between east 
and west, by constructing one of the most modern port facilities in the region (Jacobs and Hall 
2007). Such an establishment could also be initiated in Norway to exploit the potentially 
growing container volumes on the NSR, given that the Norwegian government, Scandinavian 
region and private businesses commit to the development.  
 
Figure 7: The Strategic Location of Kirkenes and the Potential Trade Volumes in the Area, 
(Source: Falck, 2012) 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The overall aim of this paper was to explore whether NSR’s commercialisation could yield 
benefits for the Scandinavian economy and ports. Various costs and risks were identified as 
distinctive for Arctic shipping. However, this must be seen in relation to the benefits that the 
NSR may offer, such as shorter distance, substantially reduced fuel costs and increased 
productivity. For this reason, we conclude that the NSR can be a viable alternative to the 
Southern route.  
By discussing the findings from the case study, the researchers found that the 
commercialisation of NSR could create many opportunities for Scandinavia through Norway, 
thus the route can be considered of high importance for Scandinavia. The potential implications 
to the Scandinavian economies further underpin the importance of the route, as this could 
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provide positive synergies for businesses and create more jobs if utilised the right way. To 
investigate that, future research is needed in order to identify the type of strategy (or strategies) 
the Norwegian ports need to implement. Under those strategies, the environmental impact for 
using the NSR should also be examined. 
We argue that there are several benefits for calling Norwegian ports against Northwest 
European ports because of their strategic location, free capacity and large areas for future 
expansion. However, there are also limitations in the current port network such as 
unsatisfactory infrastructure and restricted hinterland. Nevertheless, we conclude that the 
principal reason for shipping lines operating the NSR to call Norwegian ports is the benefits a 
transhipment hub in Northern Norway can offer e.g. transparent regulatory framework, 
decreased need for ice-classed vessels and independence of the inadequate ports along the 
route.  
This paper focussed exclusively on container shipping on the NSR, and therefore disregarded 
other cargo types. Considering that destinational traffic is strong in NSR, particularly for oil 
and gas, future research could examine the opportunities of Scandinavian countries and 
specifically Norway in these markets. Additionally, it could be of interest to explore 
commodities that are valuable but not time restricted such as cars. Thus, investigating car 
carriers, which face smaller penalties for being late, could potentially improve the 
attractiveness of NSR for through-traffic too. Norway has one of the world’s largest car carrier 
fleets, comprising shipping companies such as Norwegian Car Carriers (NOCC) and Höeg 
Autoliners which own some of the largest vessels (8,500 car equivalent units) (Höeg Autoliners 
2017, NOCC 2017). Investigating the NSR with a focus on car carriers could assist Norwegian 
ship owners in operating the route, as they will primarily support their own country. 
Additionally, a comparison of containerised and not containerised transportation on the NSR 
could reveal unexpected differences in terms of costs, risks and therefore the viability of the 
route. Finally, the possible opening of a rail alternative from Northern Europe to Asia received 
little attention in this study. Such an establishment could be a competitor to the NSR, and 
thereby undermine its potentials. Furthermore, Norway is not the only nation to be benefited 
by the commercialisation of the NSR but the whole Scandinavia, as rail and road infrastructure 
would be utilised. Therefore, it is of vital significance that Norway is proactive and exploits 
the first-mover advantage to secure its involvement and future profit. 
Limitation of this paper is that the lack of appropriate research on Scandinavia, in relation to 
the NSR, may have caused the researchers to put too much emphasis on subjective opinions.  
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Thus, its outcomes cannot be generalizable, as it is mainly focused on the Scandinavian 
economy and ports. Additionally, the paper lack to identify managerial implications especially 
concerning the strategy or the strategies to be set up by the Scandinavian government and port 
authorities (medium-long run) to position the countries (specifically Norway) as a hub for Artic 
shipping in the container sectors and others. It would be interesting for future research to 
identify the role of the Norwegian maritime cluster in this strategy.  Finally, future research 
could try to identify Scandinavia’s existing repair-maintenance and SAR infrastructure, which 
could be important for the developed traffic.   
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Appendix 1: Identified Risks of Container Shipping on the NSR and Suez Canal Route 
Table 3: Identified Risks of Container Shipping on the NSR and Suez Canal Route, (Source: 
Author’s own) 





Air pollution (Arctic Council 2009; 
Eyring et al. 2010) 
Air Pollution (DNV 2010) 
Increases of acid deposition 
(Dalsoren et al. 2007) 
 
Risk of oil and chemical spill (Arctic 











Ship Design and 
Operation  
Risk of damage to ships (Arctic 
Council 2009; Liu and Kronbak 
2010) 
Lack of flexibility of designed 
schedules and fleet size (Qi and Song 
2012) 
Increased risk of accidents (Arctic 
Council 2009; DNV 2010) 
Oil price rise (Husdal and Bråthen 
2010; Liu and Kronbak 2010) 
Limited accident preparedness 
(Arctic Council 2009; Schøyen and 
Bråthen 2011; Ragner 2000b; Ho 
2010; Kitagawa 2008) 
 
Harsh climate (severe cold, total 
darkness during winter) (Arctic 
Council 2009; Lasserre and Pelletier 
2011; Verny and Grigentin 2009; Xu 
et al. 2011) 
 
Risk of being out of schedule 
(Reliability of the route) (Arctic 
Council 2009; Lasserre and Pelletier 
2011) 
 
Cargo damage (Arctic Council 2009; 
Lasserre 2014) 
 
Shallow ground at the coast of Russia 
(risk of hitting the ground) (Arctic 
Council 2009; Ho 2010) 
 
Sea ice along the route (drifting sea 
ice, getting stuck in the ice) (Lasserre 
and Pelletier 2011) 
 
Prevalence of fog (Lasserre and 
Pelletier 2011) 
 
Ice accumulation on the vessel 
(Lasserre 2014) 
 
 Poor infrastructure (ports sparsely 
distributed, and of low quality) 
Port congestion (unforeseen waiting 
times before berthing or before 
loading/unloading) (Tummala and 
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(Arctic Council 2009; Xu et al. 2011; 
Schøyen and Bråthen 2011) 
Schoenherr 2011; Notteboom 2006; 
Drewry 2009) 
Repair facilities might be located far 
away (Schøyen and Bråthen 2011; 
Ragner 2000a; Ho 2010; Kitagawa 
2008) 
Port productivity being below 
expectations (Tummala and Schoenherr 
2011; Notteboom 2006; Drewry 2009) 
Port capacity and deteriorating 
conditions of port equipment (Ragner 
2000a) 
Port strikes (Drewry 2009; Notteboom 
2006; Tummala and Schoenherr 2011) 
Lack of ice-breaking capacity 
(Ragner 2000a; Moe 2014) 
Risk of cargo damage and cargo being 
stolen from unsealed containers 





Inadequate chartering and 
monitoring, and control of ship 
movements (DNV 2010) 
Attacks from terrorists or pirates (Fu et 
al. 2010; Tummala and Schoenherr 
2011; Drewry 2009;  Notteboom 2012) 
Inadequate Search & Rescue 
operations (Arctic Council 2009; 
DNV 2010; Ranger 2000a) 
 






Impacts to the indigenous people of 
the Arctic (Arctic Council 2009) 
Developing nations neighbouring the 
Suez Canal (Schøyen and Bråthen 
2011; Fu et al. 2010) 
 
Governance  
Dependence on Russia’s political and 
economic situation (Liu and Kronbak 
2010) 
Political tense area (Mostafa 2004; 
Schøyen and Bråthen 2011) 
Internationally legally binding 
conventions and regulations are not 
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